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I. INTRODUCTION
Hollywood has taught us that people using computers can take over
the world.1 Recent lawsuit decisions have begun to teach us that the
world can take over people using computers, too, by haling them into
court thousands of miles from home or office based on electronic con-
tact.2 Literature abounds with discussion of the promising future of the
"information superhighway" 3 and the increasing interconnectivity of the
world by electronic communication. Rarely discussed, however, is the
legal impact that electronic interconnectivity may have in binding the
Internet4 to a much slower, more physically grounded forum, the judi-
1. Or at least almost take over the world. See, e.g., THE NET (Sony Pictures
1996); HACKERS (Metro-Goldwyn Mayer/United Artists 1996). Or that people who run
the world in the future will use computers to do it. See, e.g., BRAZIL (Universal 1986);
1984 (Virgin Cinema 1980). Or that computers themselves will take over the world.
See, e.g., THE TERMINATOR (Cinema '84/Pacific Western 1984).
2. See infra notes 57-88, 101-60 and accompanying text (discussing cases extend-
ing personal jurisdiction based on electronic contact).
3. The origin of this phrase is attributed to different sources, but I believe that
extensive repetition by Vice President Al Gore is most responsible for emblazoning it
upon the international psyche. See, e.g., Al Gore, Networking the Future: We Need a
National "Superhighway" for Computer Information, WASH. POST, July 15, 1990, at B-
3.
4. The term "Internet" is used loosely throughout this Article to include all forms
of electronic communication. In fact, the Internet, although the most popular elec-
tronic connector today, is one of several. Others include commercial on-line services,
private bulletin board services, and corporate networks. See William S. Byassee, Ju-
risdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community,
30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 200 (1995).
Additionally, the Internet is often misunderstood to mean a single computer
network. The reality differs significantly:
The Internet today is a worldwide entity whose nature cannot be easily or
simply defined. From a technical definition, the Internet is the 'set of all
interconnected IP networks'-the collection of several thousand local, region-
al, and global computer networks interconnected in real time via the TCP/IP
Internetworking Protocol suite.
DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 16 (1994).
One article described the Internet as 'a collection of thousands of local, re-
gional, and global Internet Protocol networks. What it means in practical
terms is that millions of computers in schools, universities, corporations, and
other organizations are tied together via telephone lines. The Internet enables
users to share files, search for information, send electronic mail, and log
onto remote computers. But it isn't a program or even a particular computer
resource. It remains only a means to link computer users together.
cial system.5 While not quite matching the pace of the explosive rate of
growth of Internet users,6 the number of electronic personal jurisdic-
tion cases is growing, and promises to continue growing.7 At the same
Unlike on-line computer services such as CompuServe and America On Line,
no one runs the Internet....
No one pays for the Internet because the network itself doesn't exist as a
separate entity. Instead various universities and organizations pay for the
dedicated lines linking their computers. Individual users may pay an Internet
provider for access to the Internet via its server.'
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1365-66 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting David Bruning, Along the InfoBain, AS-
TRONOMY, June 1995, at 76).
The Internet began in 1969 as a Department of Defense project entitled
"ARPANET," linking military computers, defense contractors, and colleges. See Barbara
Kantrowitz & Adam Rogers, The Birth of the Internet, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1994, at 56;
Patricia Schnaidt, History of the Future, NETWORK COMPUTING, Oct. 1, 1994, at P35. In
1990, the network was replaced with NSFNET and more advanced technology. See
APRIL MARINE ET AL., INTERNET: GETTING STARTED 5 (1993). For a more extensive dis-
cussion of the workings of the Internet and the World Wide Web, see Gwenn M.
Kalow, Note, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction Over World Wide
Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241 (1997).
5. Commentators have begun to wave warning flags. See Robert L. Dunne, Deter-
ring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling Behavior in Cyberspace Through
a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 JURIMTERICS J. 1, 9 (1994) ("Probably the ultimate
insurmountable obstacle to the practical application of criminal law in cyberspace is
jurisdictional."); Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, On-Line Legal Issues, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 15, 1995, at 30 ("The immense reach of the Internet clearly has the potential to
eviscerate or circumvent any traditional jurisdictional limitations.").
6. The explosive growth of the Internet is widely known and reported. See, e.g.,
JILL H. EuswoRTH & MATTHEW V. ELLSWORTH, MARKETING ON THE INTERNET 5 (2d ed.
1997); Byassee, supra note 4, at 197; Curt A. Canfield & Joseph Labbe, Web or Win-
dows? Planning for Internet/Intranet Technology-Explosive Growth Experienced,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 21, 1997, at S2. The number of Internet users is doubling annually. See
Graham Finnie & Kenneth Hart, Can the Internet Do It All?, COMM. WK. INT'L, Oct. 2,
1995, at 22. In 1981, there were fewer than 300 computers on the Internet. See Amer-
ican Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). By 1989, this
number had grown to about 90,000, and by 1993, the number reached over 1 million.
See id. Today there are an estimated 30 to 60 million Intermet users, and this number
is anticipated to exceed 100 million in 1998. See Eu1SWORTH & ELLSWORTH, supra, at
5. In 1999 the number of Internet users is expected to reach 200 million. See Hearst
Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96-63620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *4, (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
26, 1997). By the end of the century, some expect more than 500 million Internet
users. See Byassee, supra note 4, at 198 n.2.
7. A few personal jurisdiction decisions resting on e-mail contacts date back to
the early 1990s. See, e.g., Boudreau v. Scitex Corp. Ltd., No. 91-13059-Y, 1992 WL
159667 (D. Mass. June 25, 1992"); Equifax Servs. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1358 (10th
Cir. 1990). However, several such decisions have been published in the last two
years. See infra Part III.A. (discussing e-mail cases). As use of the Internet increases
and court decisions remain inconsistent in applying personal jurisdiction analysis, this
trend is certain to continue. See infra Part HI.A
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time, commercial use of the Internet is becoming a bigger and bigger
business,8 demanding for the sake of commerce that some understand-
able parameters apply to the accompanying judicial cost.
For future discussion of the problems that may visit those engaging
in electronic communication and commerce, the following hypothetical
may prove helpful: Tom Jefferson, an unemployed political consultant
in Virginia, decides to start a political consulting software company out
of his garage. His best experiences in political consulting were in Phila-
delphia, so he names his company and software package Philadelphia
Rules. He obtains an e-mail address of <philadelphiarules@server.com>
and a website at <www.philadelphiarules.com>. 9 While Mr. Jefferson
has traveled extensively on the east coast and in some parts of Europe,
he has never been west of the Mississippi River and has no intention of
going there.1°
Mr. Jefferson sets up the website to automate software sales, take
credit card orders, and download the software directly from the
Internet. As a result, he has no idea where his software is being sent.
Because the Internet is accessible from anywhere on the globe, so is
Mr. Jefferson's product.
One day Mr. Jefferson gets an e-mail from <benfranklin@server.com>.
The author of the e-mail has created an add-on module to the
PhiladelphiaRules program and proposes to license it to Mr. Jefferson
for sale with the program. During successive e-mail communications,
the author and Mr. Jefferson reach an agreement. Mr. Jefferson receives
the program via the Internet and begins to sell it. Mr. Jefferson assumes
that <benfranklin@server.com> is another political consultant whom he
knew worked in the Philadelphia circuit and was most recently living in
Virginia. In fact, <benfranklin@server.com> is actually Ben Franklin
Johnson who lives in San Diego and owns a store named Kite & Key, a
8. See American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 173; Jill H. Ellsworth, Staking a
Claim on the Internet, NATION'S Bus., Jan. 1, 1996, at 29. Use of the web by law
firms is a case in point. The number of law firms with websites has increased 70%
since 1996. See Cynthia Cotts, Sharp Rise in Web Sites by Largest Firms, NAT'L L. J.,
Oct. 6, 1997, at B7. Almost two-thirds (64%) of the 250 largest law firms have
websites. See id.
9. This may be a good time to remind readers that this is a hypothetical. As of
this writing, none of these Internet addresses actually exist. Do not try to find them.
Any similarity to persons or websites living or dead is purely coincidental.
10. While not relevant to this discussion, he did once consider buying some land
there.
kite sales and locksmith store. Since his days at U.C. Berkeley, political
activism has been a hobby of Mr. Johnson, or "California Benny," as his
friends know him. As a result, the communication and agreement Mr.
Jefferson thought occurred within Virginia was all cross-continental.
Similarly, California Benny erroneously assumes that Mr. Jefferson lives
in Philadelphia.
As with any litigation hypothetical, Mr. Jefferson and California Ben-
ny have a falling out. Each files suit against the other in his local dis-
trict court. Meanwhile, an aspiring politician named Hamilton living in
Manhattan buys the software and module and feels cheated when he
loses the city council race by a landslide. He files suit in his local dis-
trict court for breach of contract against both Jefferson and California
Benny. Finally, a company named Philadelphia Rules, Inc., actually
based in Philadelphia, sues Jefferson in Pennsylvania, claiming that his
e-mail name, website, and software infringe upon its trademarks. Jeffer-
son, inundated with out-of-state cases and fearing bankruptcy, consid-
ers moving back to Paris and becoming a panhandler. But will lie actu-
ally be expected to appear in court in California, Pennsylvania, and
New York? And will California Benny be dragged out to New York and
Virginia?
Under personal jurisdiction analysis, theoretically each court should
undergo the same analysis.1" However, courts in these states have ap-
plied the analysis quite differently. 2 As a result, Jefferson may be able
to get the case dismissed in New York and California (depending on
which California court reviews the issue), 4 while being pulled into
court in Pennsylvania. 5 California Benny may have to appear in the
11. Each court should undergo the same personal jurisdiction analysis if that
state's long-arm jurisdiction statute is coextensive with the limits of the United States
Constitution. Some states have opted to restrict their jurisdiction over out-of-state
persons more than the Constitution. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text
(discussing long-arm statutes).
12. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2065, at *41 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (finding no personal jurisdiction); Bensusan Res-
taurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3,d 25 (2d
Cir. 1997) (finding no personal jurisdiction). For detailed discussion of these cases,
see infra notes 161-76 and accompanying text.
14. Compare Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 402 (Ct. App. 1997) (extending
personal jurisdiction), and Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 622
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (extending personal jurisdiction), with McDonough v. Failon
McElligott, Inc., No. 95-4037, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139, at *5-*6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5,
1996) (refusing to apply personal jurisdiction to out-of-state party). For detailed dis-
cussion of these cases, see infra notes 77-87, 113-17, 195-98 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1127 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (extending personal jurisdiction). For detailed discussion of this case, see
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action in Virginia, 6 but not New York.17 The reason why? Modem
courts are experiencing difficulty in consistent application of personal
jurisdiction rules to electronic contacts by out-of-state residents. As
more courts reach decisions on the issue, the law of personal jurisdic-
tion is bound to grow more schizophrenic.
This Article addresses the problem created for courts in deciding
when to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state parties based on
electronic contacts. Section II discusses the traditional personal juris-
diction tests propounded by the U.S. Supreme Court.18 Section I re-
views recent case law analyzing personal jurisdiction and electronic
contacts via the Internet, through e-mail and other electronic data con-
tacts, and by website presence. 9 Section IV discusses the modes of
communication that courts have analogized to the Internet and how
these courts have resolved jurisdictional issues when facing more tradi-
tional contacts such as mail and advertising.' 9 Section V discusses the
future of personal jurisdiction, concluding that current overreaching by
some courts stems from misapplication of personal jurisdiction prece-
dent.2 Proper application of the spirit of the Supreme Court's personal
jurisdiction decisions and the concept of "purposeful availment" will
avoid the nightmare of a legal world wide web. Section V also discusses
the implications of the current state of the law for businesses using the
Internet, and some basic steps these businesses may take to attempt to
regain some control over their jurisdictional exposure and avoid person-
al jurisdiction in unknown states for commercial litigation. The Internet
may be a way to increase the reach of a state's power. However, a
more restrained analysis based on how much a party has really pur-
posefully availed itself to a particular jurisdiction will permit the
Internet to function advantageously while continuing citizens' current
level of access to their states' courts.
infra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Telco Communications Group, Inc. v. An Apple A Day, Inc., 997 F.
Supp. 404, 408 (E.D. Va. 1997). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra
notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Hearst Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *41; Bensusan, 937 F.
Supp. at 301. The situation is essentially the same for California Benny as for Jeffer-
son.
18. See infra notes 22-56 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 57-201 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 202-36 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
II. THE TRADITIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION TESTS
A. A Brief Tour: Pennoyer to International Shoe to Burger King and
Asahi
Personal jurisdiction is one of the fundamental concepts in civil pro-
cedure law in the United States and remains one of the few areas with
case names that law students continue to remember after taking their
exams. It is written about extensively, leaving no need for this Article
to retrace extensively a worn path." The following, then, represents a
brief encapsulation of the development of personal jurisdiction due
process law in the United States as necessary to provide background
for analysis of current electronic issues.
In 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court viewed personal jurisdiction through
a very narrow perspective as related to the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.' It held, in
Pennoyer v. Neff, that a state could not assert jurisdiction over anyone
not physically present in the state at the time of the lawsuit.24 This
view did not last. The Supreme Court laid a more detailed groundwork
for modern personal jurisdiction analysis in the 1945 decision Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington.25 In International Shoe, the Court held
that instead of physical presence, a defendant may be subjected to a
state's jurisdiction if the defendant had "minimum contacts" with the
forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"2"
The Supreme Court clarified the ruling in subsequent decisions, hold-
ing, for example, that unilateral activity by a plaintiff, such as mailing a
letter from the forum state to the nonresident defendant, will not be
enough to meet the minimum contacts analysis.27 Instead, the nonresi-
dent defendant must purposefully avail itself of the forum state's ben-
efits to be subjected to the state's jurisdiction.28 The defendant's con-
duct and connections with the forum state should be "such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. "'
22. For an extensive analysis of the current state of personal jurisdiction law, see
Symposium, Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Ju-
risdiction, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513 (1995); see also William M. Richman, Under-
standing Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARiz. ST. L.J. 599 (1993).
23. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
24. Id. at 722.
25. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26. See id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
27. See Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
28. See id.
29. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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To decide if exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
would be fundamentally fair under the Due Process Clause, the Su-
preme Court looked to five factors in the 1985 decision of Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz: ° (1) "'burden on the defendant,'" (2) the forum
state's interest in adjudication of the dispute, (3) "'the plaintiffs interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief,'" (4) the interstate judicial
system's interest in efficient controversy resolution, and (5) the shared
interests of the states in furthering fundamental social policies."s The
Court held that while physical presence was not required to meet the
minimum contacts requirement, the defendant must purposefully direct
sufficient activity toward the forum state to be within the court's juris-
diction.' The majority opinion in Burger King also suggests that com-
mercial ties to a state should weigh more heavily than personal ties in
applying the fundamental fairness analysis.' Finally, in 1987 the Court
held in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court' that merely plac-
ing a product in the stream of commerce would not alone support ex-
tension of jurisdiction to any state where the product turned up. 5 In-
ternational Shoe and its progeny lay the groundwork for any contempo-
rary personal jurisdiction analysis.
Before a state reaches constitutional personal jurisdiction analysis,
the state itself must otherwise favor exerting jurisdiction over the per-
son.' States accomplish this through "long-arm" jurisdiction stat-
utes.37 The longest reach a state can have is coextensive with the Con-
stitution, limited by the Due Process Clause.8 However, some states
30. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
31. See id. at 476-77 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagon Corp., 444 U.S. at 292).
32. See id. at 476.
33. See DAvID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 106 (2d ed.
1992).
34. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
35. See id. at 114.
36. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 82. To extend jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
fendant, the case must satisfy both the state's jurisdictional statute and the Due Pro-
cess Clause. See id.; see also, e.g., Jobe v. ATR Mktg., Inc., 87 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir.
1996); CPC-Rexcell, Inc. v. La Corona Foods, Inc., 912 F.2d 241, 243 (8th Cir. 1990).
37. See CRUMP, supra note 33, at 82.
38. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1998) ("A court of this state
may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
state or of the United States"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1996) ("Every foreign corpo-
ration, [individual, or entity] . . . that shall have the necessary minimum contacts
with the state of Rhode Island, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the state ....
have opted for "laundry list" jurisdictional statutes that claim jurisdic-
tion over people only when the subject falls within a list.39 In these
cases, courts may not always reach the constitutional due process is-
sue.' This Article will continue on the premise that each state will un-
dergo due process analysis, unless otherwise noted.
When a complaint is filed against a nonresident defendant, the defen-
dant may specially appear to challenge the jurisdiction of the court over
the defendant." It then becomes the burden of the plaintiff to make a
"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A) (Michie 1996) (extending jurisdiction "to the extent
possible under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States").
39. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2.209 (1996) (Illinois's long-arm statute);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (1996) (New York's long-arm statute). For example, one category
on the laundry list will cause a New York court to extend jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant for any tortious act committed outside the state if the defendant
"expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and
derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." See N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) (1996).
40. See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997)
("Because we believe that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the instant case is
proscribed by the law of New York, we do not address the issue of due process").
The trial court, however, opted to perform the due process analysis, finding that
contacts to the forum state were insufficient to extend jurisdiction under the Consti-
tution. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
41. The procedural methods of challenging personal jurisdiction in federal court are
summarized as follows:
Prior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion
may defeat the motion by pleading in good faith, legally sufficient allegations
of jurisdiction. At that preliminary stage, the plaintiffs prima facie showing
may be established solely by allegations. After discovery, the plaintiffs prima
facie showing, necessary to defeat a jurisdiction testing motion, must include
an averment of facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to establish
jurisdiction over the defendant. At that point, the prima facie showing must
be factually supported.
Where the jurisdictional issue is in dispute, the plaintiff's averment of
jurisdictional facts will normally be met in one of three ways: (1) by a Rule
12(b)(2) motion, which assumes the truth of the plaintiffs factual allegations
for purposes of the motion and challenges their sufficiency, (2) by a Rule 56
motion, which asserts that there are undisputed facts demonstrating the ab-
sence of jurisdiction, or (3) by a request for an adjudication of disputed
jurisdictional facts, either at a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction or in the
course of trial on the merits. If the defendant is content to challenge only
the sufficiency of the plaintiffs factual allegation, in effect demurring by
filing a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the plaintiff need persuade the court only that
its factual allegations constitute a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. If the
defendant asserts in a Rule 56 motion that undisputed facts show the ab-
sence of jurisdiction, the court proceeds, as with any summary judgment mo-
tion, to determine if undisputed facts exist that warrant the relief sought. If
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prima facie showing that the defendant is subject to the court's juris-
diction or the complaint is dismissed.42 If the plaintiff makes the pri-
ma facie showing, the defendant must defend the lawsuit.
B. General vs. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
Under International Shoe, as clarified by later Supreme Court deci-
sions, personal jurisdiction may apply in two cases: either when the
defendant has enough contacts for "general" personal jurisdiction, or
when less extensive but "specific" personal jurisdiction exists.' Under
general jurisdictional analysis, a defendant with "systematic and contin-
uous" contacts with the forum state may be haled into court for any
legal dispute, whether or not related to the contacts the defendant has
with the forum.' For example, if WRI Corporation, an Illinois corpora-
tion based in Chicago, has many offices in California and conducts ex-
tensive business there, it will be subject to a California court's jurisdic-
tion, even if the dispute is unrelated to its California business. Such
unrelated disputes could include an injury sustained in the Chicago
offices by a California resident, or a contract completely negotiated,
entered into, and performed in Illinois.
Specific jurisdiction is more limited and applies when the lawsuit
arises out of the contact with the forum state." If WRI Corporation
the defendant contests the plaintiffs factual allegations, then a hearing is
required, at which the plaintiff must prove the existence of jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Ball v. Metallurgic Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.) (citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854 (1990); see also, e.g., PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander,
103 F.3d 1105, 1108-11 (2d Cir. 1997); Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir.
1995); Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 146 (1st Cir.
1995); A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1993); Boit v. Gar-
Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 676 (1st Cir. 1992); Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d
393, 396 (4th Cir. 1986); Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Inc., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d
Cir. 1985); Bell v. Fischer, 887 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
42. See Ball, 902 F.2d at 197.
43. See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984). One court has described general and specific jurisdiction as the two "flavors"
of personal jurisdiction. See Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., 106 F.3d 147, 149
(6th Cir. 1997).
44. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952)
(holding that a foreign corporation doing limited, but continuous and systematic,
business in Ohio is subject to in personan jurisdiction in Ohio despite the fact that
the dispute was unrelated to the corporation's activities in Ohio).
45. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957)
had no offices or general contact with California, but entered into a
contract with CPA Company in San Diego to be performed in San Die-
go, it is likely that WRI Corporation, while not within the general juris-
diction of California courts, would be within the court's specific juris-
diction to adjudicate disputes over the WRI-CPA contract. In conjunc-
tion with the due process requirements expounded in Burger King,
courts view specific personal jurisdiction analysis as a tripartite test,
requiring that (1) the nonresident defendant purposefully availed itself
of the forum state, (2) the dispute arises from the defendant's contact
with the forum state, and (3) extension of jurisdiction over the defen-
dant would be fundamentally fair.4"
Cases turning on an out-of-state defendant's e-mail communications
to the state or website presence in the state usually involve questions
of specific jurisdiction.47 The threshold for satisfying minimum con-
tacts before considering convenience or fairness is higher for general
jurisdiction than for specific jurisdiction." As a result, while it is theo-
retically possible that an extensive electronic presence could justify
extension of general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant without
any physical contacts to a state,49 courts have rarely done so.' Even
(finding specific jurisdiction where suit was based on a contract which had a sub-
stantial connection with the state).
46. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. CyberselU, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997);
Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, Assessing
Minimum Contacts: A Reply to Professors Cameron & Johnson, 28 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 863, 866-67 (1995).
47. See infra notes 63-88, 101-27, 132-59 and accompanying text.
48. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 568 (2d
Cir. 1996).
49. As one court in Illinois noted:
At some point, however, we must begin to give serious renewed consider-
ation to the effect of such 'communications' on jurisdiction. We are now in
an age where e-mail, fax, phone conferences and televideo conferences are
quickly replacing plane trips and personal conferences and consultations. By
these means it may now be possible to conduct a substantial amount of
business in a jurisdiction without ever physically being present.
MHF Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Harris of Kentucky, No. 95C 0016, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
402, at *17 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 1996). This language may be seen as an update of
the language in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985): "[I]t is an
inescapable fact of modem commercial life that a substantial amount of business is
transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating
the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted." How-
ever, the Court in Burger King reiterated the need for the defendant to "purposefully
direct" activities to the forum state. See id.
50. In at least one case, the court asserted general jurisdiction over a defendant
based on ownership of a website accessible in the state. See Haelan Prods., Inc. v.
Beso Biological Research, Inc., No. 97-0571, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10565, at "14-*15
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with other, more concrete modes of communication such as telephone
and postal mail, courts have generally refused to extend general juris-
diction over non-domiciliaries without substantial physical presence in
the forum state."
C. Forum Selection and Choice of Law Clauses
In many contracts, the parties include clauses "choosing" the appro-
priate forum, or jurisdiction, in which any disputes should be resolved.
While not determinative, such clauses become part of the purposeful
availment analysis.52 Using the above example, if the WRI-CPA con-
tract includes a forum selection clause stating that any disputes should
be resolved in Illinois, a court in California would be less likely to find
that WRI Corporation availed itself of California's benefits or that it
would be fundamentally fair to bring WRI into California court. Even if
insufficient to eliminate the forum's jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant, courts will generally enforce forum selection clauses.'
Similarly, parties will often include choice of law clauses in their
contracts. A choice of law clause chooses which jurisdiction's law will
apply to any dispute arising from the contract. Choice of law analysis is
separate from minimum contacts analysis, but is considered relevant to
the jurisdictional question.' If a court in a state other than that chosen
by contract extends personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defen-
dant, it may nevertheless apply the law of the chosen state to resolve
the dispute." The clause may be enforced unless there is no reason-
able basis for the parties' selection or the law is contrary to a funda-
mental policy of the state.5 Using our previous example, even if WRI
Corporation was clearly within California's jurisdiction, the California
(E.D. La. 1997); infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (discussing Haelan). An-
other court, while asserting only specific jurisdiction, entertained assertion of general
jurisdiction due to a website and certain other contacts to the forum stat6. See infra
EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 422 (D. Ariz. 1996);
infra notes 132-43 and accompanying text (discussing EDIAS).
51. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
52. See Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. Trans W. Polymers, Inc., 53 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir.
1995).
53. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shutte, 499 U.S. 585, 595-97 (1991); Burger
King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985).
54. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 481-82; Bell Paper Box, 53 F.3d at 923.
55. See Nedlloyd Lines, B.V. v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1992).
56. See id. at 465.
court would be likely to apply Illinois law if the WRI-CPA contract; had
a provision stating that the contract was to be governed by Illinois law.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN INTERNET E-.MAL
AND WEBSITE CASES
Courts conducting persona] jurisdiction analysis relating to electronic
presence in the state generally do not distinguish between e-mail and
websites; instead, they look at both as forms of Internet contact with
the state." However, because e-mail communications differ structurally
from websites,' they will be reviewed separately here.
A. E-mail Cases
The concept of electronic communication as a factor in personal
jurisdiction analysis is not entirely new. As far back as 1990, the Tenth
Circuit looked at "electronic data communications" combined with
phone and mail contacts as a basis for assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion.59 In 1992, the federal district court in Massachusetts viewed e-
mail communications as part of the basis for personal jurisdiction, in
conjunction with faxes, telephone calls, and at least one in-person visit
by the defendant's employee.' However, in each of these cases, the
courts did not cite electronic communications as a dispositive factor in
the decision to extend personal jurisdiction." Instead, the courts mere-
ly added electronic communications to a list of contacts that otherwise
would be sufficient for personal jurisdiction to exist. 2
In contrast, in the last couple of years, several courts have begun to
base assertion of jurisdiction more directly upon e-mail communica-
tions. Generally, these courts have applied traditional personal jurisdic-
57. See, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (distinguishing its facts, where the jurisdictional claim was based solely on
website presence, from those in Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.
1996), where the claim was based primarily on e-mail and other direct electronic
communication with a resident of the forum state), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
58. E-mail is sent from the creator of the e-mail to a recipient. In contrast, a
website remains at a server as designated by its creator and must be "Visited" by
those on-line using search engine software. Those visiting a website download the
data file constituting the site from the server.
59. See Equifax Servs. Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1358 (10th Cir. 1990).
60. See Boudreau v. Scitex Corp., No. 91-13059-Y, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9629, at
*10-*11 (D. Mass. June 25, 1992).
61. See Equifax Servs., 905 F.2d at 1358; Boudreau, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9629, at
*10-*11.
62. See Equifax Servs., 905 F.2d at 1358; Boudreau, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9629, at
*10-*11.
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tion analysis, grouping e-mail contact with and analogizing it to mail
and telephone contacts.
1. Extending Jurisdiction
a. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson
The most famous court decision to date regarding the Internet and
personal jurisdiction continues to be the Sixth Circuit's 1996 decision in
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson.' The plaintiff, CompuServe, Inc., filed
suit in its home state of Ohio.Y The defendant, a resident of Texas,
entered into a contract with CompuServe to have CompuServe sell his
software products over its network.' He subscribed to CompuServe
and entered into a shareware registration agreement with CompuServe
to have his software distributed electronically from Ohio.' He sent his
software repeatedly to the CompuServe system, and advertised on the
system." E-mail and regular mall messages sent by the defendant to
CompuServe in Ohio supplemented the advertising.' There was no
evidence, however, of any physical visits to Ohio.69 The court stated
that while entering into a contract with an Ohio resident or placing
software into the stream of commerce in isolation would not be suffi-
cient, the combination of all contacts proved purposeful availment.0
The court held that the electronic contacts between the defendant and
63. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). For a complete discussion of this case, see Bryce
A. Lenox, Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Teaching the Stream of Com-
merce Dog New Internet Tricks: CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.
1996), 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331 (1997).
64. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261.
65. See id. at 1260.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1261.
68. See id. at 1264.
69. See id. at 1260.
70. See id. at 1265. Merely entering into a contract with a resident generally is not
enough to confer jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Colwell Realty Invs.,
Inc. v. Triple T Inns of Arizona, Inc., 785 F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1986); Maurice
Sternberg, Inc. v. James, 577 F. Supp. 882, 885 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Courts have held that
isolated commercial contracts such as sales are not enough to subject a nonresident
seller to a forum's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Lovett &
Tharpe, Inc., 786 F.2d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding one-time purchase insuffi-
cient); L & P Converters, Inc. v. H.M.S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 365, 366
(D. Mass. 1986) (finding phone orders from forum state insufficient).
CompuServe were sufficient to extend specific personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.71
Based on the amount and quality of contacts, the Sixth Circuit prop-
erly extended jurisdiction over the defendant under standard due pro-
cess analysis.72 This was not a case where the defendant simply put a
website on the Internet or exchanged e-mail communications without
knowing the location of the other party. Instead, the defendant purpose-
fully availed himself of the benefits of Ohio.73 Additionally, the action
arose directly from the defendant's contacts with CompuServe in
Ohio.74 As the court noted, "CompuServe, in effect, acted as [the
defendant's] distributor, albeit electronically and not physically."' Ad-
ditionally, the defendant had fair notice that he could be haled into
court in Ohio. He knew that CompuServe was based in Ohio and opted
to link directly to a server in Ohio for all of his communications rather
than use a local server.7" CompuServe, then, represents mainstream
analysis based on fairly easy facts.
b. Hall v. LaRonde
In Hall v. LaRonde,77 the Court of Appeal in Ventura County, Cali-
fornia, recently held that "the use of electronic mail and the telephone
by a party in another state may establish sufficient minimum contacts
with California to support personal jurisdiction."78 The defendant,
maintaining his principal place of business in New York, entered into a
contract with the plaintiff, a resident of California. Under the con-
tract, the plaintiff received a license to sell the defendant's software
application. ° The plaintiff originally contacted the defendant via e-mail
regarding a module that the plaintiff created for defendant's applica-
tion."1 The parties negotiated by e-mail for the plaintiffs module to
become integrated into the defendant's software package. 2 All contact
was by e-mail and telephone."
71. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268-69.
72. See id. at 1263-67.
73. See id. at 1266.
74. See id. at 1267.
75. See id. at 1265.
76. See id. at 1264.
77. 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 1997).
78. See id. at 400.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 401.
82. See id.
83. See id.
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Reversing the trial court, the appellate court in Hall held that this
contact was sufficient to create personal jurisdiction over the defendant
with respect to claims arising out of the subject matter of the e-mail
contact, also known as specific personal jurisdiction.' The court held
that it was unnecessary for the defendant or a representative to physi-
cally visit California.' "There is no reason why the requisite minimum
contacts cannot be electronic," the court stated 6 "It is uncontroverted
that [the plaintiff] reached out to New York in search for business. It is
also uncontroverted that [the defendant] reached back to California."8
Because the defendant communicated extensively with the plaintiff by
e-mail, contracted with the party, and agreed to pay royalties over time
to the California plaintiff, the court determined that the defendant had
sufficient contacts to justify ordering him to appear in California to de-
fend against the claim.'
c. Other Modern Cases
In several other cases, courts have viewed e-mail communications in
conjunction with other contacts as part of a holistic personal jurisdic-
tion analysis.' As with the CompuServe and Hall decisions, none of
84. See id. at 401-02.
85. See id. at 402.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. But cf. Interdyne Co. v. SYS Computer Corp., 107 Cal. Rptr. 499, 501
(Ct. App. 1973) (holding that nonresident purchaser dealing with a California resident
through out-of-state agents, mail, or phone had insufficient contacts for personal juris-
diction).
89. See, e.g., Agency Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 98 F.3d 25,
29-32 (2d Cir. 1996) (extending jurisdiction over licensees who entered into agency
contracts in the forum state and regularly accessed the licensor's computer system in
the forum state); Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43, 45-46 (D. Conn. 1997) (holding
fraudulent e-mail and phone messages were enough to extend jurisdiction); Plus Sys.,
Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111, 118-19 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding
modem computer contacts by an out-of-state defendant combined with licensing con-
tract entered into in forum state, payments made to forum state, and physical visits
by defendant's representative equated to purposeful availment in Colorado and sup-
ported extension of personal jurisdiction); Richard Howard, Inc. v. Hogg, No. 12-96-5,
1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5533, at *6-*9 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1996) (holding that e-
mail transmissions could support personal jurisdiction in a case where jurisdiction
could not be shown otherwise).
the cases are based solely upon e-mail exchange." A common thread
in these decisions is that they each analogize e-mail contacts with
phone and mail contacts in attempting to extend jurisdiction to nonres-
ident defendants. 1 With these analogies, the courts find that e-mail
and other contacts combine to meet the minimum contacts necessary
to support personal jurisdiction.
2. Not Extending Jurisdiction
In Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.,9 a Florida
court refused to extend jurisdiction over a New York travel agency.93 A
dispute arose between the defendant and the plaintiff, a reservation ser-
vice provider.94 The plaintiffs New York office negotiated the contract
in New York, but the agency accessed the plaintiffs Florida-based com-
puter reservation system and sent payments to Florida.9 The court
determined that these contacts were insufficient for specific personal
jurisdiction, stating:
[A] contrary decision would, we think, have far-reaching implications for business
and professional people who use 'on-line' computer services for which payments
are made to out-of-state companies where the database is located.... Such a
result, in our view, is wildly beyond the reasonable expectations of such comput-
er-information users, and, accordingly, the result offends traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."
A district court in Virginia recognized and avoided the extreme results
that could occur from assertion of jurisdiction based on a few electronic
contacts from a foreign individual. 7 In Alton v. Wang,98 a Chinese
Internet user sent e-mail messages and letters in response to an article
authored by a Virginia resident.' The court concluded that such contact
could not support personal jurisdiction over the individual in China who
had never been to Virginia. °°
90. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2065, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (comparing e-mail to mail and phone communi-
cations).
92. 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (1994).
93. See id. at 1353.
94. See id. at 1352.
95. See id. at 1353.
96. Id.
97. See Alton v. Wang, 941 F. Supp. 66, 67-68 (W.D. Va. 1996).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 66-67.
100. See id. at 67-68.
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B. Website Cases
1. Extending jurisdiction
In several states, courts have held that the existence of a website is
enough to extend jurisdiction over the website owners. Holdings in these
cases can be placed roughly into two categories: (a) a website alone will
confer specific personal jurisdiction or (b) a website plus other contacts
will confer specific jurisdiction.
a. Website alone cases
Decisions with the most widespread and frightening implications to
businesses hold that existence of a website alone will confer specific
jurisdiction. For example, in Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., ' a Mis-
souri plaintiff sued a California corporation for trademark infringe-
ment."l The defendant had no physical contacts with Missouri. 3 The
only basis for personal jurisdiction was that the defendant had a website
in California that could be accessed anywhere, including Missouri.'"
The court held that extension of personal jurisdiction was proper, be-
cause the act of creating a website was purposeful availment of every
jurisdiction globally.' °5 The court further held that considerations of fair
play and substantial justice were met because the court was adjudicating
the trademark infringement claim of one of its residents.'06
101. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
102. See id. at 1329.
103. See id. at 1330.
104. See id.
Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, defendant's contacts with Mis-
souri are as follows. [sic] CyberGold maintains an Internet site on the World
Wide Web. The server for the website is presumably in Berkeley, California-
The website is at present continually accessible to every Internet-connected
computer in Missouri and the world.
Id. The basis for jurisdiction, as seen by the court, was that the defendant's website
"appear[ed] to be maintained for the purpose of, and in anticipation of, being ac-
cessed and used by any and all internet users, including those residing in Missou-
ri . . . ." See id. at 1332.
105. See id. at 1332-34.
106. See id. at 1334.
The District Court in Connecticut reviewed a similar factual situation
in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. 7 As in Maritz, the plain-
tiff claimed trademark violation."8 The nonresident defendant had no
employees or offices in Connecticut, nor did it regularly conduct busi-
ness in Connecticut."° The defendant's only alleged contacts with Con-
necticut were its global Internet website and its maintenance of a nation-
al toll-free phone number."0 The court held that the defendant had pur-
posefully availed itself "not only [to] the state of Connecticut, but to all
states.""' The court did not specify whether it was extending general or
specific jurisdiction. However, in discussing minimum contacts, the court
did not undertake the specific jurisdiction analysis, thereby implying that
the defendant could be brought into court for any dispute, not merely
one relating to its website."I
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,"l Panavision sued an
out-of-state defendant for trademark infringement.' Essentially
Panavision accused the defendant of "stealing" its website by purposely
registering the company's name before the company could."5 Although
the website was not actually in operation, the court held that this act
was "intended to, and did, result in harmful effects in California. "" 6 The
court stated that the defendant purposely availed himself of the privi-
leges of the forum by expressly aiming his conduct at the California
company. M
While the holding in Panavision is somewhat consistent with trade-
mark cases, it extends the reach of jurisdiction too far. A website does
not reach into the forum state, but rather serves as a location that can
be visited by people anywhere who reach out to it."" While the
defendant's improper motive may have been a persuasive reason to as-
sert jurisdiction, the future ramifications of the decision should have
dissuaded the court. As a later court stated, "'Panavision appears to be
one of those cases where 'hard cases make bad law."' 9
107. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
108. See id. at 162.
109. See id. at 162-63.
110. See id. at 164.
111. See id. at 165.
112. See id. at 164-65.
113. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
114. See id. at 618-19.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 622.
117. See id.
118. See supra note 4 (discussing the structure of the Internet).
119. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2065, at
*59 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (citing Board of County Comrnr's v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct.
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Perhaps the most egregious example of jurisdictional overreaching,
however, comes from a case where the nonresident defendant did not
have a website. A Virginia district court in Telco Communications v. An
Apple A Day'2 extended jurisdiction over a Missouri defendant based
on activities of a third party advertiser. 2' Here, the defendant did not
maintain a website, but rather paid another company named Business
Wire for distribution of its press releases in Connecticut, New York, and
New Jersey (not Virginia)."2 As a "bonus," Business Wire then placed
the releases on its databases, on-line services, and Internet sites.'23 Un-
like defendants in other cases, this defendant did not even have a na-
tional toll-free number.'" This fact did not deter the court, which hy-
pothesized on the defendant's behalf, "[flor example, if a Virginia invest-
ment bank saw their press release and called the Defendants, Defendants
would not have refused the call."'' The court found that because the
third party Internet site with defendant's advertisement could be ac-
cessed at any time by Virginia residents, the advertisement "constitute[d]
a persistent course of conduct ... [] rising to the level of regularly doing
or soliciting business" in the state.2 The court concluded that "each of
the Defendants made specific and purposeful moves to place the press
releases on the Internet, which is the basis for jurisdiction in this
case."
127
While each of the "website only" courts stretch the bounds of personal
jurisdiction to entirely new areas, the Telco decision goes the farthest. It
extends jurisdiction to a nonresident defendant based on acts of a third
party, acts unknown to the defendant. This violates both the purposeful
availment and the fair notice requirements of due process analysis. Juris-
2361, 2373 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n,
502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Letelier v. Republic of Chile,
748 F.2d 790, 791 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985); United States v.
Mastrangelo, 662 F.2d 946, 953 (2d Cir. 1981) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (1982)).
120. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997).
121. See id. at 408.
122. See id. at 407.
123. See id.
124. Cf. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D. Conn.
1996) (finding personal jurisdiction where defendant maintained a toll-free phone num-
ber); see supra notes 107-12 (discussing Inset).
125. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 406.
126. See id. at 407.
127. See id. at 408.
diction based upon the contacts of a party's business associates is too
attenuated and may not be applied.'"
Generally, these decisions form the basis of the current personal juris-
diction scare.'29 Based on little or nothing more than creation of a
website, these courts have forced the owners into courts based solely
upon the location of the plaintiff.3 ° In some cases, the website was not
yet operational, and no actual contact had been made with the forum
state.' Clearly, this exceeds the bounds of reason and completely evis-
cerates the "fair notice" requirement while promoting forum-shopping,
i.e., the practice of filing suit based upon which jurisdiction has law most
favorable to the plaintiff, instead of the location of the parties.
Notably, however, each of these cases is based upon trademark claims
arising from either the existence of a site address, or trademark or defa-
mation claims from the content of a site. No court thus far has talen the
next step of extending jurisdiction to hale a website owner into court
simply because an individual who accessed the site sued, for example,
for negligently providing information. Nevertheless, the analysis would be
the same.
b. Website-plus cases
Some courts view ownership of a website in conjunction with other
contacts as sufficient to extend personal jurisdiction. As such, these
decisions are more in line with the e-mail cases because they rely on
other contacts made by telephone and mail as part of the analysis.
128. See McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. 95-4037, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15139, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996).
129. Scarier yet is the decision in Haelan Products, Inc. v. Beso Biological Re-
search, Inc., No. 97-0571, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10565, at *14-*15 (E.D. La. July 11,
1997) (finding a defendant within the court's general personal jurisdiction based on a
website, national ads, and a national toll-free number). For further discussion of this
case, see infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
130. See also Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL
767431 (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 1996), affd, 568 N.W. 2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App.), review
granted, 1997 Minn. LEXIS 829 (Minn. Oct. 31, 1997). In the Granite Gate situation
the state's Attorney General filed for an injunction under gambling laws of the state.
See Granite Gate Resorts, 1996 WL 767431, at *1. The court upheld jurisdiction but
noted that courts "do not view the contacts the same as what is necessary for a
private litigant to pursue a case . . . ." See id. at *10. For further discussion of this
case and jurisdiction over Internet gambling, see generally Nicholas Robbins, Baby
Needs a New Pair of Cybershoes: The Legality of Casino Gambling on the Internet,
2 B.U. J. SO. & TECH. L. 7 (1996); Seth Gorman & Antony Loo, Comment, Blackjack
or Bust: Can U.S. Law Stop Internet Gambling?, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 667 (1996).
131. See Telco, 977 F. Supp. at 408 (basing jurisdiction on "specific and purposeful
moves" to advertise on the Internet).
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For example, in EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd.," a
federal district court in Arizona held that a pattern of contacts with the
forum state surrounding a website was sufficient to confer specific per-
sonal jurisdiction." The plaintiff, an Arizona corporation, entered into
a contract with the defendant, a New Mexico corporation, to distribute
the defendant's software products in Europe." Plaintiff filed the suit in
Arizona, claiming breach of contract and defamation for content posted
on the defendant's website." The court found that a strong argument
could be made for general personal jurisdiction due to the defendant's
"substantial, ongoing relationship with [the plaintiff], involving communi-
cations, visits to Arizona, sales, and Internet activities."" The court de-
clined to rule on this issue, however, because it found specific personal
jurisdiction to exist.37
The EDIAS court reached the correct result in finding specific jurisdic-
tion, but not due to the presence of a website. The court found specific
jurisdiction based on the extensive contract entered into with the plain-
tiff and the ongoing agency relationship with the Arizona company."
The defendant had fair notice that the plaintiff could sue in Arizona be-
cause Arizona was the plaintiffs principal place of business.'39 The de-
fendant took several trips to Arizona for contract negotiations.4 ° The
defendant sent invoices to Arizona.' Lastly, the defendant contacted
the plaintiffs employees via phone, fax, mail, and e-mail.' The court
mentioned the fact that the defendant had a website only with respect to
defamation allegations stemming from both the website and specific e-
mail messages sent to Arizona-
132. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
133. See id. at 422.
134. See id. at 414-15.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 417.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 418.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 419-21. Courts have applied personal jurisdiction more expansively in
the defamation context than in normal commercial disputes. For example, the Su-
preme Court has held that the minimum contacts test is met in a state where the in-
jury is felt, including the defamed party's state of residence. See Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 791 (1984).
In Haelan Products, Inc. v. Beso Biological Research, Inc.,1" a Loui-
siana federal court extended jurisdiction on little more than the exis-
tence of the nonresident defendant's website."' In addition to a
website, the defendant also had a national toll-free number and adver-
tised in national trade publications. 46 The court held that this was suf-
ficient to meet the minimum contacts requirement, the purposeful
availment requirement, and the Due Process Clause.147 The court came
to this conclusion even though the defendant was based in California,
had no phone number, mailing address, office, employee, or property in
Louisiana, did not directly solicit any customer in Louisiana, and was
unaware that it had a website' 48 Moreover, the court found that the
defendant's contacts were enough to subject it to general personal ju-
risdiction, so that the defendant could be haled into court in Louisiana
for any reason. 4 '
As with the website only cases, the Haelan decision is the kind of case
that may instill fear in companies worldwide. It clearly overreaches, fails
to understand the significance of the structure of the Internet, and, if
taken up as a majority position by courts, could stifle the future cf elec-
tronic communication. In the history of the Supreme Court's personal
jurisdiction cases, the farthest reaches of specific jurisdiction occur
when a nonresident defendant enters into a contract with someone who
later moves to the forum state and the dispute arises from that con-
tract. "' The Haelan decision stretches the concept of personal jurisdic-
tion beyond reason, dragging a person into court because of national and
international advertising, regardless of whether the dispute concerns the
advertising. Under this rationale, any defendant with a website would be
within the world's jurisdiction.
If EDIAS presents a case of proper extension of jurisdiction and
Haelan a clear case where the nonresident defendant should not be sub-
ject to a forum's jurisdiction, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc.5 ' perhaps illustrates best the gray zone in between. In Zippo,
144. No. 97-0571, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10565 (E.D. La. July 11, 1997).
145. See id. at *14-*15.
146. See id. at *3.
147. See id. at *14-*15.
148. See id. at *3.
149. See id. at *9 n.2 (holding that specific jurisdiction factors need not. be ad-
dressed based on a court's discussion of general jurisdiction).
150. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). This decision
is seen as the high water mark of personal jurisdiction, a position from which the
Supreme Court retreated significantly the following year in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 251-52 (1958). See Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Juris-
diction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 531, 535 (1995).
151. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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the defendant, a California corporation, was haled into court in
Pennsylvania.'52 The defendant sold passwords to Internet users that
were in turn used to access the defendant's information." It marketed
the service through a website posted on a server in California." At the
time of the filing of the trademark infringement suit, the defendant had
3000 subscribers in Pennsylvania, approximately two percent of its total
business."' The court employed a "sliding scale" analysis of
contacts," concluding that the number of contacts had slid past the
jurisdiction point."7 The court also reasoned that the acts of sending
information to Pennsylvania subscribers constituted trademark dilution,
therefore requiring only that the test for specific jurisdiction be met to
extend the court's jurisdiction over the defendant." Courts in Massa-
chusetts, New York, and New Jersey have reached the same result based
upon similar facts."'
While the court in Zippo takes pains to carefully reason its decision,
its misanalysis of the specific jurisdiction question leads to the wrong
result. While the court states that it is asserting specific personal jurisdic-
152. See id. at 1121.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1124.
157. See id. at 1127.
158. See id.; see also Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 622 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) (analyzing trademark infringement under "effects" test and finding that the
dispute arising from website contacts with the forum state met specific jurisdiction
requirements); supra notes 113-17 (discussing Panavision). Other courts have re-
viewed trademark infringement claims as unrelated to contacts made by individuals in
the forum state, and thereby requiring general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Maritz, Inc. v.
CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding the existence of
an accessible website enough to meet the general personal jurisdiction test required);
Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D. Conn. 1996)
(finding the existence of an accessible website enough to give court jurisdiction but
failing to specify whether it was extending general or specific jurisdiction); see also
supra notes 101-12 (discussing Maritz and Inset).
159. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 468-72
(D. Mass. 1997) (finding that a website created minimum contacts); American Net-
work, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494, 498-500
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding a website with six subscribers and $150 per month in income
from the forum state enough to confer jurisdiction for a trademark infringement suit);
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 2-5 (D.D.C. 1996) (extending jurisdic-
tion for trademark infringement based on advertising in the jurisdiction's primary
newspaper and having website accessible in the jurisdiction).
tion, many of the contacts should really be characterized as unrelated, or
only slightly related, to the dispute and should really apply only to a
general personal jurisdiction analysis. As the Supreme Court held in Bur-
ger King, it is not merely the number, but the quality of the contacts that
should be reviewed.'" This rule should apply not only to the purposeful
availment requirement, but also to the requirement that the dispute arise
from the contact or contacts to assert personal jurisdiction.
2. Not Extending Jurisdiction
New York has staked out the opposing camp on the website jurisdic-
tion question, consistently refusing to subject non-domiciliaries to its
jurisdiction. In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,"' for example,
Richard King, a resident of Columbia, Missouri, and owner of a small
club named "The Blue Note," posted a website on the World Wide
Web. '6 The corporate owner of "The Blue Note" jazz club in New York
City filed suit in New York for trademark infringement, trademark dilu-
tion, and unfair competition." The plaintiff alleged personal jurisdic-
tion over King based solely on the fact that King's website was accessible
in New York." There was no allegation that King sold or attempted to
sell anything in New York through use of the website."
The district court granted King's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, holding that New York's long-arm statute did not cover the
situation and that constitutional due process considerations prevented
extension of jurisdiction over King.'" The court applied standard due
process analysis, but departed from courts of other states by analogizing
to the Supreme Court decision in Asahi.' "Creating a site, like placing
a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide--or even
worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed
toward the forum state."" As a result, the court held that a website
was not enough contact with the forum state to invoke personal jurisdic-
160. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985); see also Reynolds v.
International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1119 (6th Cir. 1994); Stuart v.
Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985).
161. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
162. See id. at 297.
163. See id. at 297-98.
164. See id. at 301 ("There is in fact no suggestion that King has any presence of
any kind in New York other than the Web site that can be accessed worldwide.").
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Id.
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tion." On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
on state law grounds and declined discussion of due process. 7 '
A very similar factual situation presented itself to the Southern District
of New York in Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger.'7' In Hearst Corp. the
plaintiff, a New York corporation, sued the defendant, an individual busi-
ness owner in New Jersey, for trademark infringement.17 Ari
Goldberger, the defendant, was an attorney in Cherry Hill, New Jersey;
the primary basis for personal jurisdiction was that Mr. Goldberger creat-
ed a website that had been electronically visited by computers in New
York. 73 He did not sell any products or services in New York.'" After
a detailed review of Internet personal jurisdiction case law,'70 the court
concluded that extension of jurisdiction for maintenance of a website
that could be accessed in New York would violate a nonresident's due
process rights and refused to extend jurisdiction.7
Perhaps the farthest-reaching attempts by plaintiffs to use website
ownership to extend personal jurisdiction come from New York"'7 and
New Jersey.'70 In Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler,'7" the
plaintiff claimed that a Netherlands general partnership was within New
York's jurisdiction because it advertised on the Internet.'" The defen-
dant had no physical contacts with the United States.'0 ' The claim for
employment discrimination did not stem from the website, so the plain-
tiff attempted to use the site to establish general personal jurisdic-
169. See id.
170. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1997).
171. No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
172. See id. at *1.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at *49-*63.
176. See id. at *63-*66. In contrast to these decisions, the same district recently
found that a website with some minimal other contacts was enough to support per-
sonal jurisdiction. See American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta,
Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (asserting jurisdiction over a Georgia
defendant in a trademark infringement and unfair competition case based on website
with six New York subscribers).
177. See Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
178. See Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997).
179. 977 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
180. See id. at 662.
181. See id. at 661.
tion 82 The Southern District of New York granted the foreign
defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the Internet advertising did
not constitute a systematic and continuous course of doing business in
New York.1 "
Similarly, in Weber v. Jolly Hotels," a New Jersey resident sustained
injuries in a hotel in Sicily, Italy.' The plaintiff alleged jurisdiction
over the Italian corporate hotel owner based on the fact that the hotel
owner had a website with pictures and descriptions of the hotel facilities
and rooms and telephone numbers." The court quoted the Hearst deci-
sion to find the contacts inconsistent with traditional personal jurisdic-
tion case law."8 7 It found the situation analogous to advertising in a na-
tional. magazine, finding that such contact could not support jurisdic-
tion. The court held, "[e]xercising jurisdiction in such a case would
be unjust and would disrespect the principles established by Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny."1
In other similar cases, courts have also refused to extend personal
jurisdiction when based solely on website access in the forum state. In
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,9 ° the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the claim of an Arizona corporation named Cybersell that a
Florida corporation of the same name infringed on its trademark by
maintaining a website accessible in Arizona. 9' There was no other con-
tact with Arizona, and the only "hit" on the Florida company's website
consisted of the visit by the plaintiff.'92 The court noted that "no court
has ever held that an Internet advertisement alone is sufficient to subject
the advertiser to jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home state."98 'I'he court
held that the mere existence of a passive website is not sufficiently di-
rected to each forum where people could access the site.'
182. See id. at 661-63.
183. See id. at 662.
184. 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997).
185. See id. at 329-30.
186. See id. at 329-31.
187. See id. at 333-34.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 334.
190. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
191. See id. at 415.
192. See id. at 419.
193. See id. at 418.
194. See id. at 419.
Otherwise, every complaint arising out of alleged trademark infringement on
the Internet would automatically result in personal jurisdiction wherever the
plaintiffs principal place of business is located. That would not comport with
traditional notions of what qualifies as purposeful activity invoking the bene-
[Vol. 25: 451, 1998] The Legal World Wide Web
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
In McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc.,105 the defendant was sued
by a California corporation for alleged copyright violations." The plain-
tiff claimed the following bases for personal jurisdiction: defendant hired
independent contractors in California, advertised in California newspa-
pers, and had a website."'7 The court refused to extend jurisdiction,
stating, "[blecause the Web enables easy world-wide access, allowing
computer interaction via the web to supply sufficient contacts to estab-
lish jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as
it currently exists .... Thus, the fact that [the defendant] has a Web site
used by Californians cannot establish jurisdiction by itself."'98 In SF Ho-
tel Co. v. Energy Investments, Inc.,'99 a federal court in Kansas also
dismissed a trademark claim on jurisdictional grounds when the sole
basis of jurisdiction was the fact that the defendant had a website acces-
sible in Kansas.2 "
A theme among these decisions is the careful consideration of the
ramifications of extending jurisdiction based on a global electronic pres-
ence. However, these cases do not necessarily provide comfort to busi-
nesses concerned about being brought before courts in their jurisdic-
tions. In both New York and California, recent court decisions have ex-
tended jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in cases with similar
facts.2
0
'
fits and protections of the forum state.
Id. at 420 (citing Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1262 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also
Randall Broberg & Eric Hagen, Cyberspace Has Borders, But They're Ill-Defined, LA.
DAILY J., Dec. 12, 1997, at 5 (discussing the Cybersell case and its implications). See
also Shapiro v. Santa Fe Gaming Corp., No. 97 C6117, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2488, at
*6 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 26, 1998) (a passive, nonadvertising website and toll-free phone num-
ber held insufficient to satisfy jurisdiction or venue); Graphic Controls Corp. v. Utah
Med. Prods., No. 96-CV-0459 E(F), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7448, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. May
21, 1997) (same); Mallinekrodt Med., Inc. v. Sonus Pharms., Inc., Civ. No. 97-1732
(PLF), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136, at *24 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 1998) (posting messages to
national electronic bulletin board held insufficient to confer jurisdiction).
195. No. 95-4307, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996).
196. See id. at *2-*3.
197. See id. at *4-*7.
198. Id. at *7.
199. No. 97-1306, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19711 (D. Kan. Nov. 19, 1997).
200. See id. at *9.
201. See, e.g., American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975
F. Supp. 494, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (asserting jurisdiction over a Georgia defendant
in a trademark infringement and unfair competition case based on a website with six
New York subscribers); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 622 (C.D.
IV. ANALOGIZING TO TELEPHONE, MAIL, AND ADVERTISING CONTACTS
Several courts have looked to cases involving telephone, mail, and
advertising when deciding whether personal jurisdiction applies to non-
resident defendants based on electronic contacts, including e-mail and
websites. °20 The benefit of analogy to these media is that they have a
more extensive history and developed personal jurisdiction analysis. But
what exactly do the phone, mail, and advertising cases tell us about mini-
mum contacts? Before ascertaining how close electronic contacts are to
existing technologies, we must determine in the first instance whether
these technologies give us any consistent criteria. If application of per-
sonal jurisdiction analysis is already confused with regard to existing
media, then it will not be very helpful in paving the way for jurisdictional
analysis in the future.
A. Telephone and Mail Cases
In many cases, courts have held that use of interstate methods of com-
munication, such as telephone lines and mail, are insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction.0 3 Additionally, without a contract, phone calls in-
Cal. 1996) (extending specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a trade-
mark infringement case based on the existence of website). In comparison, in both
Hearst and Bensusan the website had no commercial links to the forum. See Hearst
Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 1997); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); supra notes 161-76 and accompanying text
(discussing Hearst and Benususan). In Hearst, the website was not yet operational,
so no electronic contact had been made. See Hearst, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at
*63-*66; supra notes 171-76 (discussing Hearst). The American Network decision,
however, indicates that the cautionary language in Hearst and Bensusan may not
extend very far.
202. See, e.g., Hearst Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *39 (denying personal
jurisdiction based upon Internet contact); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257, 1261 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996) (comparing e-mail to other mail); Bensusan Restaurant,
937 F. Supp. at 301; McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. 95-4037, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15139 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) (denying personal jurisdiction based upon
Internet contact).
203. See, e.g., Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. Trans W. Polymers, Inc., 53 F.3d 920, 923 (8th
Cir. 1995) (stating that the use of interstate facilities, including mail and phone lines,
cannot alone establish minimum contacts); Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d
1387, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1995) (asserting that phone calls and acceptance of money
from state's residents were insufficient for general jurisdiction); Reynolds v. Interna-
tional Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1119 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding letters and
phone calls to a resident inadequate to establish sufficient minimum contacts for per-
sonal jurisdiction); Casualty Assurance Risk Ins. Brokerage Co. v. Dillon, 976 F.2d
596, 600 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that sparse correspondence did not support jurisdic-
tion in defamation case); Market/Media Research v. Union Trib. Publ'g Co., 951 F.2d
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to the forum state generally will not support jurisdiction.2 °" However,
102, 105 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that telephone calls and mail sent to Ohio were
insufficient for personal jurisdiction); Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 622 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("[bloth this court and the courts of California have concluded that ordi-
narily 'use of the mails, telephone, or other international communications simply do
not qualify as purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protection of the [forum]
state"') (quoting Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1262 (9th Cir. 1985)); Wines v.
Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., 846 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding no purposeful
availment where the defendant advertised in the forum state through a nationally
publicized journal); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 816 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding no jurisdiction where the parties formed the contract in England but signed
it in the forum state, with execution and termination conducted by mail); Stuart v.
Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that communication be-
tween a resident and nonresident regarding a developing contract was not purposeful
availment); Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1262 (holding that internal communications are not
purposeful availment); Bond Leather Co. v. Q. T. Shoe Mfg. Co., 764 F.2d 928, 932-35
(1st Cir. 1985) (finding four letters to the forum state, at least one phone call from
the forum state to the plaintiff, and a guarantee to plaintiff of payment for goods
sold to another corporation collectively insufficient to extend personal jurisdiction);
Institutional Food Mktg. Ass'n v. Golden State Strawberries, Inc., 747 F.2d 448, 456
(8th Cir. 1984) (finding that phone conversations -and written correspondence were
insufficient contacts); Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026,
1029 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding interstate communications made to the forum state insuf-
ficient); Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 655-56 (8th Cir.
1982) (finding the use of the telephone, mail, and banking insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction); Scullin Steel Co. v. National Ry. Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309,
314 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding the use of interstate telephone and mail services insuf-
ficient to satisfy minimum contacts requirement); Lakeside Bridge & Steel v. Mountain
State Constr., 597 F.2d 596, 604 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding the minimum contacts re-
quirement not satisfied by interstate telephone calls and written correspondence be-
tween the parties); Capital Dredge & Dock Corp. v. Midwest Dredging Co., 573 F.2d
377, 380 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that mail and phone contacts were not enough to
establish personal jurisdiction); Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583,
587 (2d Cir. 1965) (negotiating and executing contracts for goods by phone and mal
was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); Breiner Equip. Co. v. Dynaquip,
Inc., 539 F. Supp. 204, 206 (E.D. Mo. 1982) ("Neither use of the mails, telephone
calls, nor unilateral activities on the part of the plaintiff ... is enough to subject a
defendant to service of process in Missouri."); Bross Util. Serv. Corp. v. Aboubshait,
489 F. Supp. 1366, 1371-72 (D. Conn.) ("[T]ransinssion of communications between an
out-of-state defendant and a plaintiff within the jurisdiction does not, by itself, consti-
tute the transaction of business in the forum state"), affd, 646 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.
1980).
204. See, e.g., Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecomms. (PTE), Ltd., 89 F.3d 519,
523 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that mail and faxes alone cannot establish jurisdiction);
Far W. Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1077 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating the well-
established principle that telephone contacts alone are not necessarily sufficient to es-
when such contacts are widespread enough, and lead to contractual or
other relationships in the forum state, they are reviewed as part of the
rationale to extend jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.2"5
tablish personal jurisdiction); Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23
F.3d 1110, 1119 (6th Cir.) (1994) (reasoning that contractual relations alone do not
satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction); Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales
Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that an isolated phone call is not
enough to establish personal jurisdiction); CPC-Rexcel, Inc. v. La Corona Foods, Inc.,
912 F.2d 241, 243-44 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that several phone orders by nonresident
defendant to plaintiff were insufficient for personal jurisdiction); Nicholas v. Buchan-
an, 806 F.2d 305, 307-08 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that telephone calls and letters into
the state were not enough to meet due process jurisdictional requirements); Fiedler v.
First City Nat'l Bank, 807 F.2d 315, 316-18 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding three telephone
calls and one mailing into the forum state insufficient for personal jurisdiction); Fox
v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that a single telephone call was
insufficient for personal jurisdiction); C & H Transp. Co. v. Jensen and Reynolds
Constr. Co., 719 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir. 1983) (refusing to extend jurisdiction over
defendant for phone calls made to the forum state); Mayes v. Leipziger, 674 F.2d 178,
184-85 (2d Cir. 1982) (refusing to extend jurisdiction for phone calls and letters into
forum state); Scheidt v. Young, 389 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir. 1968) (finding a newspaper
advertisement and plaintiffs call in response to such advertisement insufficient for
minimum contacts); Premier Lending Servs., Inc. v. J.L.J. Assocs., 924 F. Supp. 13, 16
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that defendant's telephone, fax, and mail contacts were insuf-
ficient to impose jurisdiction); Beckett v. Prudential Ins. Co., 893 F. Supp. 234, 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding one telephone call insufficient for personal jurisdiction); Tau-
rus Int'l Inc. v. Titan Wheel Int'l Inc., 892 F. Supp. 79, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating
that one mailing was not enough to support jurisdiction even in a trademark infringe-
ment action); Lawrence Wisser & Co. v. Slender You, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1560, 1562-63
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that telephone calls and faxes into New York, including calls
to New York media, were not sufficient for personal jurisdiction); Slocum v.
Sandestin Beach Resort Hotel, 679 F. Supp. 899, 901-03 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (holding
interstate telephone calls and mail not sufficient for personal jurisdiction); Advance
Realty Assoc. v. Krupp, 636 F. Supp. 316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that
defendant's business registration was insufficient for jurisdiction); Bennett Indus., Inc.
v. Laher, 557 F. Supp. 965, 967-69 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (holding that a flyer soliciting
business and phone calls was insufficient to assert personal jurisdiction); Lichtenstein
v. Jewelart, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 511, 514-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (reiterating that courts must
look to the quality of contacts, not quantity when deciding to exercise personal juris-
diction); Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. v. Glazer Steel Co., 503 F. Supp. 1064,
1065-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (placing an order via telex machine does not establish person-
al jurisdiction); CDI Contractors, Inc. v. Goff Steel Erectors Inc., 783 S.W.2d 846, 847
(Ark. 1990) (holding that a nonresident subcontractor's bid to a general contractor
over the phone was not enough to hale the subcontractbr into court in the general
contractor's state); Valley Wide Health Servs., Inc. v. Graham, 738 P.2d 1316, 1318
(N.M. 1987) (finding that a call from a health care clinic doctor to New Mexico was
not enough for jurisdiction over the clinic); Morrill v. Tong, 453 N.E.2d 1221, 1228
(Mass. 1983) (holding that phone calls were insufficient for minimum contacts); Pro-
fessional Personnel Mgmt. Corp. v. Southwest Med. Assocs., Inc., 628 N.Y.S.2d 919,
919-20 (App. Div. 1995) (finding interstate negotiations by telephone, facsimile or mail
insufficient to extend jurisdiction).
205. See, e.g., Whelen Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Tomar Elecs., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 659, 663-64
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Courts sometimes also differentiate between calling into a forum state
and merely receiving calls from the forum state. 6 Courts' analyses of
telephone and mail contacts relate to both quantity and quality of the
contacts. Even an entire direct mail advertising campaign constituting
thousands of mailings may be insufficient to confer jurisdiction because
the quality of the contact is very low, °7 whereas a few phone calls and
mailings, if establishing a significant substantive link to the forum state,
may be enough to extend jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant."8
B. National Advertising Cases
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether advertising in a national
publication without more may constitute purposeful availment of those
states to which the publication is sent.2"5
Courts have often held that advertising in national publications is not
enough to meet the minimum contacts requirement under the Due Pro-
cess Clause."0 Furthermore, even when the advertisements result in
(D. Conn. 1987) (finding personal jurisdiction over the defendant when he knowingly
and repeatedly placed advertisements in the forum state).
206. Compare Continental Am. Corp. v. Camera Controls Corp., 692 F.2d 1309, 1314-
15 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that calling into a forum state injected business into the
state) with Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 650-51 (5th Cir. 1994) (receiving unsolicited
telephone calls was insufficient for jurisdiction).
207. See, e.g., Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) (mailing 6000 brochures to prospective patrons was held insufficient to
confer jurisdiction).
208. See, e.g., Wysnoski v. Millet, 759 F. Supp. 439, 443-44 (N.D. Il. 1991) (holding
a single advertisement for an airplane sale, coupled with a sale in the forum state,
sufficient to extend jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant).
209. See Haelan Products, Inc. v. Beso Biological Research, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10565, at *6 (E.D. La. July 14, 1997) (finding that advertising on the Internet,
coupled with a toll-free phone number, satisfied the due process clause requirements
for purposeful availment).
210. See, e.g., Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d
1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[Mjere placement of advertisements in nationally dis-
tributed papers or journals does not rise to the level of purposeful contact with a
forum required by the Constitution in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
advertiser."); Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assoc., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 33 n.10 (3d
Cir. 1993) (finding a single advertisement in a national publication reaching the forum
state insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991
F.2d 1195, 1200 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[Aldvertising and solicitation activities alone do not
constitute the 'minimum contacts' required for general jurisdiction."); Wenche Siemer
v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that a
sales, this is not seen as transacting business in the purchasers' state.21'
national journal advertisement and direct mailings to the forum state were insufficient
to establish personal jurisdiction); Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d
1128, 1131 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding multiple national trade magazine advertisements
insufficient for general personal jurisdiction); Charlie Fowler Evangelistic Ass'n, Inc. v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 911 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that advertising in
forum state's telephone directory was not purposeful availment); Pizarro v. Hoteles
Concorde Int'l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 1260 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that advertising in a
local newspaper was not enough for general jurisdiction over a personal injury claim
in a different jurisdiction); Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40, 43
(8th Cir. 1988) (finding national trade advertisements insufficient to support jurisdic-
tion); Singletary v. B.R.X., Inc., 828 F.2d 1135, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that
advertising in national publications that reach the forum state was not enough to
establish personal jurisdiction); Johnston v. Frank E. Basil, Inc., 802 F.2d 418, 420
(11th Cir. 1986) (finding advertising in a national publication insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440,
446-47 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding national trade advertisement, even though leading to a
sale, insufficient for general personal jurisdiction); Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlan-
tic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding local newspaper adver-
tisement insufficient to extend personal jurisdiction); Growden v. Ed Bowlin & Assoc.,
Inc., 733 F.2d 1149, 1151-52 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that an advertisement in
the forum state was insufficient to establish jurisdiction in a suit arising from the
product advertised); Loumar, Inc. v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating that national advertising alone was insufficient for personal jurisdiction);
Lands-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1983)
(finding a national trade publication, together with attendance at a trade show adver-
tisement insufficient to support jurisdiction for a trademark dispute in the forum
state); Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. Watson, Ess, Marshall & Enggas, 675 F.2d 587,
589 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory listing insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction); Cascade Corp. v. Hiab-Foco AB, 619 F.2d 36, 37-38
(9th Cir. 1980) (sending a letter to the forum state alleging patent infringement insuf-
ficient for jurisdiction); Benjamin v. Western Boat Bldg. Corp., 472 F.2d 723, 730-31
(5th Cir. 1973) (finding that without concomitant sales, advertising in national maga-
zines does not establish personal jurisdiction); Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423
F.2d 584, 587 (1st Cir. 1970) (finding advertising and employing salesmen in the fo-
rum state insufficient to establish jurisdiction). But cf. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 766 F.2d
at 447 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that an advertisement related to the cause of action
may support jurisdiction); Tidgewell v. Loon Mountain Recreation Corp., 820 F. Supp.
630, 632 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding a foreign company's advertisements sufficient for
personal jurisdiction in forum state); Whelen Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Tomar Elecs., Inc., 672
F. Supp. 659, 667 (D. Conn. 1987) (extending personal jurisdiction over a defendant
in an infringement action where allegedly infringing advertisements were in thirty
publications available in the forum state); McFaddin v. National Executive Search,
Inc., 354 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (D. Conn. 1973) (finding that six advertisements over
six months in duration were enough for personal jurisdiction).
211. See 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL AcTIONS § 4.02[1][a][ix], at 4-50
to 4-54 (2d ed. 1991); see also, e.g., Frieling v. Malowest, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 75, 76
(W.D. Okla. 1993) (stating that the fact that nonresident defendant's radio adver-
tisements were heard within the forum state was insufficient for extension of jurisdic-
tion).
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In certain cases, courts have refused to extend jurisdiction for advertise-
ments in the forum state even where such advertisements were coupled
with multiple sales and shipments of goods into the state.2"2 However,
advertising is a component reviewed by courts as a reason to extend
personal jurisdiction when, together with other contacts, the overall
presence amounts to purposeful availment and puts the nonresident
defendant on fair notice.2 3
Regarding national advertising, the Fifth Circuit has propounded the
following factors to determine whether such publication is sufficient: "(1)
Whether the publications defendant advertised in circulated in the forum
state; (2) Whether the defendant advertised in these publications fre-
quently, regularly, or occasionally; (3) What amount of business was
obtained from the advertisements; and (4) Whether the defendant at-
tempted to limit the states in which its product was marketed."21 4 By
using this test, the court in Haelan Products reached a decision to ex-
tend jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant with no physical ties to
the forum state based on advertising in four national publications plus
the Internet along with maintenance of a national toll-free number.2"5
Because of the ability of individuals to directly access a website and
enter into transactions with the website owner, some courts have held
that websites are more like direct mailing contacts than national adver-
tisements.2"6 Isolated contacts by mail will not meet the minimum con-
212. See CASAD, supra note 211, at 4-50 to 4-54.
213. See CASAD, supra note 211, at 4-50 to 4-54; CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1069, at 355 (1987); see, e.g., Cubbage v.
Mercheant, 744 F.2d 665, 668-70 (9th Cir. 1984) (extending jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent physicians who advertised in a phone directory in the forum state and received
a substantial portion of their business from the forum state); Wysnoski v. Millet, 759
F. Supp. 439, 443-44 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that an advertisement for the sale of an
airplane in a national publication coupled with the sale of such plane in the forum
state was sufficient for personal jurisdiction).
214. See Haelan Products, Inc. v. Beso Biological Research, Inc., No. 97-0571, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10565, at *7 (E.D. La. July 11, 1997); see also Vault Corp. v. Quald
Software Ltd., 775 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir. 1985) (extending jurisdiction over a defen-
dant who advertised in seven national magazines without attempting to limit the
states where the product was marketed); Loumar Inc. v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759, 763
(5th Cir. 1983) (finding advertisements placed in nationally circulated publications
insufficient minimum contacts).
215. See Haelan Products, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10565, at *7-*8.
216. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 718-21
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
485
tacts requirement.21 However, in at least one case, a campaign of direct
mail solicitation has been held sufficient to extend specific personal
jurisdiction over the advertiser.21
C. Problems with Attempting to Analyze Electronic Contacts by
Analogy to Phone, Mail, and Advertising Contacts
Courts have suggested that electronic means of communication parallel
more traditional modes and should be treated in the same manner for
jurisdictional analysis. 9 Certain fundamental differences show this to
be problematic in application, however. Notably, courts that apply a
more limited view of jurisdiction tend to discuss e-mail and websites as
similar to phone, mail, and advertising contacts, ' whereas courts more
expansively asserting jurisdiction refuse to apply these analogies.221
Because there is a certain consistency to phone, mail, and advertising
cases, there is a value to analogizing. However, the analogies can only
take us so far. Courts are correct when they find such analogies limited
in their usefulness. However, courts that refuse to analogize tend to
place electronic contacts on the wrong side of the purposeful availment
line when compared with older technologies.
1. Breakdown of Telephone and Mail Analogy
The word e-mail indicates a mode of mail, much like postal mail, i.e.,
sending letters or other writings via the U.S. Postal Service or other
physical delivery system. The reality differs in several important ways.
217. See, e.g., Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1118-
19 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that correspondence to an individual in the forum state
was insufficient to extend jurisdiction over dispute arising from relationship between
the parties).
218. See, e.g., Transamerica Corp. v. Transfer Planning, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1261, 1262
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that 100 to 250 brochures sent to the forum state were suffi-
cient for personal jurisdiction in a trademark infringement action).
219. See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2065, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
220. See, e.g., id.; Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir.
1997); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1261 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996);
McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. 95-4307, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15139, at *6
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996).
221. See, e.g., Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mo.
1996) ("Because the Internet is an entirely new means of information exchange, anal-
ogies to cases involving the use of mail and telephone are less than satisfactory in
determining whether defendant has 'purposefully availed' itself to this forum."). For a
more complete discussion of the Maritz decision, see supra notes 101-06 and accom-
panying text.
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First, unlike postal mail, it is often impossible to know to what physical
,location an e-mail is being sent.2 2 Internet addresses do not have postal
codes that foretell when a communication will cross jurisdictional
lines.2  In fact, addresses may be misleading in that regard. Using our
hypothetical, a Pittsburgh resident communicating with Mr. Jefferson at
<philadelphiarules.com> would in fact be sending an e-mail to Virginia,
unwittingly making interstate contact, just as Mr. Jefferson was mistaken
in his belief that he was communicating only within Virginia when he
was really sending and receiving messages to and from California.
E-mail messages may also be copied and forwarded to multiple loca-
tions with equal ease, so that even if the sender knew where the first
copy was headed, other future copies would be completely out of the
sender's control. For example, California Benny, by agreeing to license
his module to Jefferson, has no control of where the data will go.
Also, the entire attitude and etiquette of communicating via e-mail
differs significantly from postal mail. E-mail is less formal, easier to use,
less expensive, and quicker than postal mail. Instead of taking days, it
may take minutes, which can result in multiple communications over the
course of a few hours. In this way e-mail is closer to a "written phone
call" than a letter. Many Internet users find e-mail even less intrusive
than a phone call because it may be accessed at the recipient's conve-
nience, or deleted without reading its contents.
Unlike postal mail, several commercial transactions involving e-mail
may never culminate in an exchange of physical product. A growing field
of commerce finds itself residing entirely in cyberspace. For example,
software sold on the Internet may be downloaded directly via the
Internet, as with Mr. Jefferson in our hypothetical. The future also prom-
ises an increase in information-for-fee services, which never leave the
electronic world.
Additionally, e-mall differs from phone contacts. In many cases, a per-
son knows where he or she is calling. Instead, e-mail communications
222. See Dale M. Cendali & James D. Arbogast, Net Use Raises Issues of Jurisdic-
tion, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at C7 (stating that jurisdiction may be harder in e-mail
cases than regular mail/phone cases, because e-mails do not show location of recip-
ient, so it is impossible for a defendant to knowingly reach out to the forum);
George P. Long HI, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 1177, 1178-79 (1994) (noting that Internet users can exchange informa-
tion anonymously).
223. See Cendali & Arbogast, supra note 222, at C9.
are more akin to national toll-free number phone services.224 In such an
event, the caller often never knows what jurisdiction is being called, and
the recipient at best learns of the call's origins upon receipt of the bill a
month later. Similarly, Mr. Jefferson's automated website will send infor-
mation and even sell product without Jefferson ever knowing its destina-,
tion. Several phone services sell information and bill to a credit card,
never exchanging a physical product. Unfortunately, case law regarding
jurisdiction over toll-free phone number information providers is less
developed than that regarding e-mail or websites.225 Case law regarding
other phone contacts does not closely meet the indicia of the Internet.
Thus, analogy to current technology is imprecise at best.226 Instead, e-
mail is less substantial than either postal mail or phone contacts, and
certainly less availing of a jurisdiction. The application of personal juris-
diction contacts often comes down to a subjective weighing of the quali-
ty of contacts, and when conducting this analysis, courts should consider
the informality accompanying e-mail exchanges. If the result is an entire
contractual relationship and the parties know where to expect disputes
to be resolved, as in CompuServe, electronic contacts may be enough to
confer jurisdiction. However, in many cases the casual exchange of e-
mail to unknown persons and destinations, even if accompanied by a
commercial transaction, does not sufficiently show purposeful availment
to the forum state, and should not lead to extension of personal jurisdic-
tion over the nonresident defendant.
At least one court has also discussed the analogy of websites to tele-
phone and mail contacts, including toll-free phone numbers and direct
mailing.227 In Maritz the court determined that, such analogies did not
224. See Richard S. Zembek, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental
Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 339, 370-76
(1996).
225. See, e.g., Dart Int'l, Inc. v. Interactive Target Sys., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 541, 545
(D. Colo. 1995) (refusing to extend jurisdiction over a nonresident based on existence
of a toll-free number accessible in the state); Walsh v. Maryland Bank, N.A., 806 F.
Supp. 437, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (accord); Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v.
Vanderwoude, 741 F. Supp. 873, 877-78 (D. Kan. 1990) (refusing to extend personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant based on advertisements in two national mag-
azines and a toll-free number accessible to forum residents). But cf. Haelan Products,
Inc. v. Beso Biological Research, Inc., No. 97-0571, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10565, at
*14-*15 (E.D. La. 1997) (extending jurisdiction on little more than the existence of a
website).
226. "'When people look at the Internet and try to draw analogies to existing com-
munications, it doesn't work, because the Internet is a little of everything.'" Jared
Sandberg, On-Line: Regulators Try to Tame the Untamable On-Line World, WALL ST.
J., July 5, 1995, at BI (quoting Scott Charney, Chief of the Justice Department's com-
puter crime unit).
227. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-33 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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withstand analysis of the technology differences because a website was
much lower cost and more efficient than the other communication tech-
nologies.2" While this is correct, the Maritz court used this to justify a
more expansive view of jurisdiction.229 In fact, the, lower cost and uni-
versal accessibility of websites increases the likelihood that a website
owner is not purposefully directing activity toward any state. Instead, the
website owner creates a location and awaits visitors, and unlike an ad-
vertised toll-free number, the website often must be specifically sought
out using a search engine. These factors point away from, not toward,
purposeful availment and fair notice of personal jurisdiction.
2. Websites and National Advertising Analysis
Similarly, courts may analogize websites to national advertisements.
Like national ads, a website is accessible throughout the country. Courts
have often refused to extend jurisdiction when the only contact alleged
is a national advertisement.' However, some courts have extended
specific personal jurisdiction over advertisers in national media when the
dispute arises directly from the advertisement itself.23' As a result of
this split, even if a website technologically was similar to national adver-
tising, the national advertising analogy would not prove especially help-
ful.
Websites are not exactly like national media advertising, and should be
seen as lesser contacts. Review of the Fifth Circuit test regarding nation-
al advertising in the website context illustrates the key differences. Re-
call that the Fifth Circuit uses a four-factor test for national publications:
"(1) Whether the publications defendant advertised in circulated in the
forum state; (2) Whether the defendant advertised in these publications
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Mass.
1978) (holding that general advertising alone will not confer jurisdiction, even when
leading to a sale).
231. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd.
Partnership, 34 F.3d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that television broadcast into
the forum state was sufficient for personal jurisdiction); Holmes v. TV-3, Inc., 141
F.R.D. 692, 696 (W.D. La. 1991) (accord); Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Three Star Telecast,
Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (D.P.R. 1986) (accord); Thomas Jackson Publ'g Inc. v.
Buckner, 625 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (D. Neb. 1985) (accord); United Med. Lab., Inc. v.
CBS, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 570, 572 (D. Ore. 1966) (accord).
frequently, regularly, or occasionally; (3) What amount of business was
obtained from the advertisements; and (4) Whether the defendant at-
tempted to limit the states in which its product was marketed."23"
Immediately we can see that the factors do not apply well to websites.
The first factor is meaningless in the website context because a website
either circulates nowhere or everywhere. Technically, the website exists
only at the server and must be sought out from any other location to
download its files. The downloading process and any other interaction
such as links to other sites can be seen as interaction occurring between
the site's server and the visitor's computer. As a result, the question of
circulation is fruitless.
Similarly, the second factor regarding frequency of publication is inap-
plicable because a website is again either constantly advertising or never
really advertising. The website is always accessible. However, it leads an
essentially passive existence because a user must utilize some kind of
search engine software to find the site. In this way a website is more like
a billboard sitting in one place. The user's search software is like a direc-
tory of billboards, and the Internet enables the user to track down and
instantaneously visit billboards globally. The billboard does not leap from
its structural supports to seek out prospective customers.
The fourth factor, relating to attempts of a defendant to limit the reach
of the advertisement, is perhaps the least useful of all, because at pres-
ent there is no way to stop particular geographical locations from visiting
a website.ai A website is automatically accessible everywhere.'
While some courts recognize differences between websites and print
advertising, they misunderstand the realities of the Internet as they relate
to purposeful availment. These courts tend to find websites more exten-
232. See Haelan Prods., Inc. v. Beso Biological Research Inc., No. 97-0571, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10565, at *7-*14 (E.D. La. July 14, 1997).
233.
[An Internet user cannot foreclose access to her work from certain states or
send differing versions of her communication to different jurisdictions. In this
sense, the Internet user is in a worse position than the truck driver or train
engineer who can steer around Illinois or Arizona, or change the mudguard
or train configuration at the state line; the Internet user has no ability to
bypass any particular state.
American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). "The
Internet has no territorial boundaries. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the
Internet is concerned, not only is there perhaps 'no there there,' the 'there' is every-
where where there is Internet access." Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech. Inc., 960
F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997).
234. See Digital Equip., 960 F. Supp. at 462.
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sive than print media, and fail to recognize that websites are far less
"availing" or directed toward a forum than print advertising.'
This leaves only the third factor, the amount of business obtained from
the advertisement. To the extent the website leads to sales, these be-
come additional contacts with the forum state. Once enough contacts
have been made in this regard, and product has been sent into the forum
state with the knowledge of the seller, the seller will have purposefully
availed itself of the jurisdiction. But until then, the mere presence of a
website will not lead the owner to anticipate a lawsuit in any particular
jurisdiction. The website itself is simply too ephemeral and widespread
to find that the owner is availing itself of the benefits of any jurisdiction
outside the location of the server where the data resides.
While some courts recognize differences of websites from print adver-
tising, they misunderstand the realities of the Internet as they relate to
purposeful availment. They tend to find the website more extensive, but
fail to recognize the less-availing nature of the presence.'
As a starting place, one bright-line rule that courts should extend is
that a passive website by itself, with no other transaction, is not purpose-
ful availment for general or specific jurisdiction. This rule should apply
as well to cases attempting to litigate website names.
However, as discussed above, websites offering products and services
for sale cannot be analogized to national advertising. These cases must
turn on the facts surrounding the sale or sales as well as other accompa-
nying contacts with the forum state.
V. CLARIFYING JURISDICTION IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
A. Courts Should Not Create a Legal World Wide Web
There is no need to invent a different test for personal jurisdiction due
to new technology. 7 Instead, a practical application of the current test
235. See, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D.
Conn. 1996) (extending jurisdiction because the website is a continuous advertisement
instead of a one-time mass-mailing).
236. See, e.g., id.
237. There may be other reasons to develop new personal jurisdiction guidelines,
such as decreasing business costs and giving nonresidents a sense of security regard-
ing jurisdiction that does not currently exist. See Rex. R. Perschbacher, Preface: Fifty
Years of International Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 513 (1995).
should yield results as consistent as in other substantive areas. The ratio-
nale behind the purposeful availment requirement, as the Supreme Court
stated in Burger King, is:
[I1ndividuals have "fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign," . . . [T]he Due Process Clause "gives a degree
of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to stnlcture
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit ....'2m
This "fair warning" requirement is satisfied when the defendant has pur-
posefully directed activities at the forum state."s
The common link among decisions refusing to extend jurisdiction over
out-of-state parties with little other contact than e-mail or website pres-
ence in a state is that they comprehend the vast interconnectivity of the
Internet and consider the ramifications that the decision to extend per-
sonal jurisdiction may have on the judicial system. Conversely, those
decisions extending jurisdiction not only tend to ignore the purposeful
availment and fair warning language from Burger King and World-Wide
Volkswagen, they also ignore the ramifications of their decisions.
The need for restraint comes primarily from the fact that the pace of
the Internet so far has outpaced the technological capabilities of courts
in the United States. One day, perhaps widespread use of telecon-
ferencing will reduce the burden of "appearing" in far away cases. At that
time, courts may utilize a joint jurisdiction over residents of two different
cases, and a modified personal jurisdiction analysis will be fruitful. Cur-
rently, however, due process considerations mandate that courts take a
closer look at how much any Internet user is truly purposefully availing
itself to jurisdictions across the globe.
B. Business Practices and Electronic Jurisdiction
The current, confused state of personal jurisdiction analysis and the
propensity of several states to extend jurisdiction for little other than
accessibility of a website may cause concern for businesses, especially
those who cannot afford expensive litigation in far-off forums. For those
businesses that maintain websites, and have begun to take advantage of
the ease and speed of e-mail, certain lessons can be learned from cases
involving telephone, mail, and advertising.
238. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
239. See id.
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Currently, it may not be possible to establish' a website that limits its
own jurisdictional accessibility. However, a website owner can take mea-
sures to announce that it is not availing itself of other forums. A website
owner can begin by informing visitors of the geographical location of the
site. The owner can publish a disclaimer that it is not, through posting of
the site, intending to avail itself of the benefits of any other location. The
website's home page may include a statement that all interactions are
considered to occur in the state where the website is posted. As a more
extreme measure, the owner may opt not to contract with persons of
certain jurisdictions where the location of such persons can be ascer-
tained, or refuse to send any physical product via postal mail to certain
jurisdictions when ordered. Unless necessary for commercial purposes, a
less interactive website is also less likely to be seen as directed activity
toward other jurisdictions, and therefore less likely to extend jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant.
The website may include forum selection and choice of law provisions
in any commercial transaction entered through the website, in the same
manner that such provisions are used in most commercial contracts
today. The forum selection clause may help to tailor the location of a
dispute resolution.24 ° If a defendant is unable to avoid being brought
into court outside its home state, a choice of law provision may be the
next best thing, applying the law of the defendant's home state to the
substance of the dispute.241 Additionally, an arbitration provision may
lead to an alternative forum that may be better suited to dealing with
technological issues surrounding the Internet.24 A recognition that e-
mail contacts will be scrutinized for minimum contacts and purposeful
availment analysis may lead to similar protective measures in e-mail
attachments.
On a macro level, those concerned with judicial interpretation of due
process considerations may work to persuade state legislatures to take a
more restrictive stance. In a jurisdiction with a laundry-list statute, elec-
240. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shutte, 499 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1991) (presum-
ing forum selection clause valid to transfer case to jurisdiction stated in agreement
between plaintiff and defendant).
241. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 1998); Nedlloyd Lines, B.V. v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 459, 464-65 (1992).
242. For a discussion of the potential effectiveness and particular suitability of pri-
vate arbitration to handle disputes involving the Internet, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 93-100 (1996).
tronic contacts may be defined specifically and narrowly as a separate
line item. In a state with a long-arm statute coextensive with the Due
Process Clause, the legislature may supplement the statute with a section
more narrowly discussing electronic contacts. Most of all, it is important
for businesses to think about jurisdictional and identity issues before
entering into any contractual arrangements, and especially long..term
contractual arrangements, over the Internet.
